University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 32

Issue 1

Article 1

2021

Release Roulette: The Rural-Urban Pretrial Detention Divide in
Florida
Matthew Baker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Baker, Matthew (2021) "Release Roulette: The Rural-Urban Pretrial Detention Divide in Florida," University
of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 32: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol32/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

RELEASE ROULETTE: THE RURAL-URBAN PRETRIAL
DETENTION DIVIDE IN FLORIDA
Matthew Baker*
INTRODUCTION
I.

Nationwide PretrialDetention Rates ............................... 26
Nationwide Rural vs. Urban PretrialRates ..................... 27

FLORIDA'S PRETRIAL DETENTION SYSTEM .............................. 29

A.
B.

VI.

Vera Data ......................................................................... 22
OPPAGA Reports ............................................................. 24
PopulationandArrest Data ............................................. 25
Rural-UrbanClassification..............................................25

PRETRIAL RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE ACROSS STATES..................25

A.
B.
V.

17
Rural-UrbanSentencing...................................................19
Rural-UrbanProbation....................................................20
Rural-UrbanJuvenile Justice...........................................20
Rural-UrbanDistinctionsin PretrialDetention .............. 21

DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS................................................21

A.
B.
C.
D.
IV.

4
BriefHistory of PretrialDetention .................................... 5
PretrialDetention in Context ............................................. 8
PretrialDetention Numbers on the Rise .......................... 13
Costs of PretrialDetention...............................................14

RURAL-URBAN JUSTICE DISTINCTIONS ....................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
III.

2

PRETRIAL DETENTION ...............................................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
II.

....................................................................................

Legal Structure ................................................................. 30
Intra-FloridaComparisons.............................................. 32
1. Pretrial Detention and Population.............................34
2. Pretrial Incarceration Rates Within Florida .............. 35

WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? ............................................. 37
A. PretrialRelease Programs............................................... 38
1. Comparing Counties..................................................38
2. Utilization and Costs.................................................40
3. Effectiveness ............................................................. 42

* Matthew Baker is a PhD candidate at the University of Georgia's School of Public and
International Affairs and a 2013 graduate of the University of Florida Levin College of Law. He

is also an Adjunct Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida. Special thanks
to my advisor, Christina Boyd, for her advice and encouragement and to Kyla, Brynn and Chet
who make this great adventure worthwhile.

[Vol.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLICPOLICY

2

B.

32

4. Conditions ................................................................. 43
5. Fees ........................................................................... 43
Rural Challenges..............................................................44

CONCLUSION......................................................................

......

....

45

INTRODUCTION

Among the 746,000 people held in county jails in 2020, 74% of them
have not been convicted of any crime.' In 2015, Florida detained 36,228
2
individuals who, in the eyes of the law, are actually innocent. The effect
of pretrial detention is far more acute in rural counties in Florida, where
3
rates of detention can be as high as 3% of a county's population. In
Florida, the rural-urban divide in criminal justice is very real and leads to
substantially different outcomes. 4
On top of being legally problematic, pretrial detention levies
5
substantial costs on communities, both economically and individually.
"Across the country, nearly two thirds of all inmates who crowd our
county jails-at an annual cost of roughly nine billion taxpayer dollarsare defendants awaiting trial." 6 Detaining those charged, but not
convicted, is a form of punishment because individuals lose their jobs,
their families, and hope for a future. People of color likely experience
these terrible consequences more acutely than their white counterparts.
1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[https://perma.cc/U9SM-7TDT].
2. VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS IN FLORIDA 1 (2019), https://www.vera

POL'Y

.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-florida.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XXU-86
XF]. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental premise in our system of criminal justice.

The U.S. Supreme Court held:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary" principle
whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal

law.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895)).
3. See generally VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 2, at 3.

4. Id.
How MUCH DOES IT COST? 2 (2017)
per day to jail people who are
million
$38
approximately
spend
(discussing how "taxpayers
5. See PRETRIAL JUST. INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE:

awaiting trial (63% of the total jail population, or more than 450,000 individuals on any given
day)").
6. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice
(June 1, 2011).
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Poor pretrial detainees have a false hope of release because a cash bond
is often out of reach. This is all in a legal system where, under the Equal
Protection clause, inability to pay fines or probation costs cannot be a
reason for punishment.7
Being detained before trial increases many pressures on defendants.
Pretrial detention, enhanced by the advantages held by the government at
every step of a criminal prosecution, decreases the bargaining power of
defendants and limits their access to counsel leading to guilty pleas and
higher sentences.8 Individuals, who cannot afford to pay cash bail, often
face the choice of pleading guilty to a crime or potentially losing their
livelihood and home. 9
Given this bleak picture, how do we fix a system that runs afoul of
many constitutional principles, especially in rural counties? In Florida,
the solution already exists. Nearly thirty of Florida's sixty-seven counties
utilize pretrial release programs to lower their pretrial incarceration rates,
protecting the presumption of innocence while ensuring defendants
appear in court. 0 These programs use tools like GPS monitoring, drug
and alcohol monitoring, and regular reporting to supervise individuals in
the community at a substantially lower cost than the cash bond system
with low rates of failures to appear and rearrests. Pretrial services
supervision can also lead to shorter sentence length."
At present only three of the twenty-three rural counties in Florida have
pretrial release programs,1 2 part of the detention problem that exists in
these locales. Pretrial release programs could provide a revenue-neutral,
or close, solution to high rates of pretrial incarceration and allow those
charged but not convicted to experience the reality of the presumption of
innocence.
In this Article, I empirically examine pretrial detention in the ruralurban context in Florida. Part I begins with a discussion of pretrial
detention, its history, the nationwide legal context of pretrial detention,

7. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1983). The Supreme Court held that courts
cannot punish individuals for being unable to pay court fines and fees under the Equal Protection

Clause. Id.
8. See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime,
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (Feb. 2018).
9. See John Mathews II & Felipe Curiel, Criminal Justice Debt Problems, 44 H.R. MAG.
AM. BAR ASS'N 6, 6 (2019).
10. Pretrial Release Programs Generally Comply with Statutory Data Collection
Requirements, OPPAGA (Fla. Legis. Off. Program Pol'y Analysis & Gov't Accountability,
Tallahassee, Fla.), Dec. 2011, at 1, https://oppaga.fl.gov/Documents/Reports/l 1-27.pdf

[https://perma.cc/6ZVR-ETJP].
11. J.C. Oleson, et al., The Effect of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing in Two Federal
Districts, 33 JUST. Q. 1103, 1107 (2016).
12. See discussion infra Parts V.B, V.B.1.
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13
the rise in pretrial detention, and its costs. Part II discusses criminal
4
justice differences in rural and urban jurisdictions.1 This includes
5
comparisons to sentencing, probation and juvenile justice.' Part III
discusses the several data sources used in the empirical analysis.16
In Part IV, the empirical analysis focuses on the nationwide
differences in rates of pretrial detention, highlighting rural and urban
pretrial detention rates. Florida's pretrial detention system is the subject
of Section V with an in-depth look at pretrial detention rates between
counties, using the lens of rural-urban counties as well as those with and
without pretrial release programs. 17 Finally, Part VI examines Florida's
pretrial release programs, comparing programs and their administration
with an eye towards this as a potential solution to the high rates of pretrial
incarceration in rural counties. 18

I. PRETRIAL DETENTION
Before engaging in a specific discussion of the rural and urban
differences in pretrial detention in Florida, it is helpful to understand the
rationale behind the pretrial detention historically and where the process
fits contextually in the criminal justice system. Additionally, this Article
will discuss the rise in pretrial detention nationwide as well as the
staggering costs of pretrial detention. With this foundation it is easier to
see where Florida fits into the nationwide context of pretrial detention
legally and in action.
Pretrial detention and release are often the first engagement a criminal
case has with the court system. Pretrial detention occurs when an
individual charged with a crime remains incarcerated before they appear
for trial.1 9 With many cases now beginning as warrant-less arrests, rather
than arrest-warrant cases with bonds set by a judge within the warrant,
2
these hearings take on larger importance. Pretrial detention can result
from a court order to protect public safety or because an individual is
unable to meet the financial requirements for release. While the intent of
13. See infra Part

i.

14. See infraPart

II.

15. See id.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.

18. See id.
19. See Pretrial Detention, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 7, 2013),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-detention.aspx [https://permacc

/8ABE-8BSJ].
20. William A. Schroeder, WarrantlessMisdemeanor Arrests and the FourthAmendment,

58 Mo. L. REV. 770, 770-854 (1993). Schroeder notes that "[o]nly a few American jurisdictions
still substantially follow the common law rule limiting warrantless misdemeanor arrests to

breaches of the peace committed in the arresting officer's presence, and even these permit some
minor exceptions." Id. at 784.
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the former is clear, the latter type of detention results from something
potentially less intentional but certainly more problematic. As discussed
below, this stage merits detailed examination given its importance,
impact, and placement in the criminal justice system.
A. BriefHistory of PretrialDetention
Centuries before Florida wrote its 1976 constitution emphasizing
pretrial release, this notion could be found in Anglo-Saxon common
law.2 1 During the Anglo-Saxon period courts ensured the accused's
presence at trial through a pledge of property or a pledge by a personal
surety..22 Later, local sheriffs had significant discretion in deciding under
what conditions the accused might be released as they waited for trial. 23
Abuse of this system led to reform under the Statute of Westminster in
1275, which created standards under which sheriffs could exercise their
discretion.2 4 Over four hundred years later, Parliament included a
prohibition against excessive bail in the English Bill of Rights. 25
English law concerning bail was generally adopted in the American
colonies. 2 6 In Carlson v. Landon the Supreme Court chronicled the
history of the bail clause as it translated from England to the United
States, saying:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the
English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never
been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely
to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases
where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried
over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated
any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not
prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in
which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal
cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be
death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to
say all arrests must be bailable.2 7
21. Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment's

Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 13 (2005) (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.

1, 4 (1951))

("Considering the fact that a decision regarding bail must be made of every defendant, there is not
a wealth of litigation on the issue. Bail is not an issue that is thoroughly appealed because '[r]elief
in this type of case must be speedy if it is to be effective."').
22. Peggy M. Toblowsky & James F. Quinn, PretrialRelease in the 1990s: Texas Takes
Another Look at NonfinancialRelease Conditions, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT

267, 268-69 (1993).
23. Id. at 269.
24. Id. at 270 n.19.
25. Id. at 270-71 nn.20-21.
26. Id. at 271.
27. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952).

6
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Outside of the Eighth Amendment, the right to bail was codified for
non-capital cases in the Judiciary Act of 1789.28 It is important to note
with the comparison of English to American common law that "the
Anierican Bill of Rights went further than its predecessor and was more
29
sensitive to possible abuses of government."
During the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court recognized
30
the purpose for bail was to secure a defendant's appearance in court.
Monetary bail was the primary means of securing a defendant's
appearance throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century and into
the twentieth century, and over time the personal surety option was
3
replaced by the system of commercial bondsmen. ' Over time, the
American bail system demonstrated inequity among defendants as well
32
as major problems with a commercial bondsmen system. This system
did not provide different defendants with individualized bail and led to
33
widespread unnecessary pretrial detention.
In addition to the changes in bail on the side of defendants, over time
bail determinations in the United States had to adjust because death was
sought in far fewer cases.34 In the 1960s, bail reform efforts reached a

28. Judiciary Act of 1789,

§ 33, 1 Stat. 91 (1789).

29. Lester, supra note 21, at 16.

30. See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835).
A recognizance of bail, in a criminal case, is taken to secure the due attendance
of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to submit to a trial, and the

judgement of the court thereon. It is not designed as a satisfaction for the offence,
when it is forfeited and paid; but as a means of compelling the party to submit to
the trial and punishment, which the law ordains for his offence.
Id.
31. Toblowsky & Quinn, supranote 22, at 274.
The personal surety system . . . was gradually replaced by a system of
commercial bondsmen who posted a monetary bond with the court to obtain a
defendant's release-in exchange for a generally nonrefundable fee from the
defendant. These commercial bondsmen obligated themselves to assure
defendant's court appearance or risk forfeiture of their bonds.

Id.
32. Id. at 275 nn.39-40.
33. Id.
34. Lester, supra note 21, at 17.
As American law matured, the number of capital offenses decreased and "the

individual American colonies began to permit the denial of bail in non-capital
cases .... " Death was not viewed as the only possible punishment that might
provide motivation to flee, but it was still the most compelling. Bail became

unavailable in certain special circumstances, such as when the charged crime
carried a punishment that was substantial. That trend continues today as more
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critical mass when the United States Congress chose to investigate bail
reform. 35 The Bail Reform Act of 196636 recognized those adjustments
and "required the federal courts to release any defendant charged with a
non-capital offense on his or her recognizance or on an unsecured
appearance bond unless the court determined that the defendant would
fail to appear for trial under such minimal supervision." 37 The Act made
pretrial release without financial conditions the standard, not just an
option.38 Defendants had to be released in non-capital cases unless "the
officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such release
would not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required." 3 9
While the Bail Reform Act of 1966 changed only federal courts, it started
a wave of reform at the state level as well.4 0
In spite of the progress made in the 1960s, the decades following were
not as kind to the rights of the accused. Public concern about rising crime
rates resulted in measures restricting pretrial release opportunities.41
Legislatures nationwide added "assurance of community safety as an
additional and equal criterion for determining pretrial release
conditions" 42 during the 1970s and 1980s. 43
This practice was not always widespread. While the Eighth
Amendment guarantees "excessive bail shall not be required," 4 4 the
meaning of the bail clause has evolved over time.
Initially, pretrial detention and release decisions focused on securing
a defendant's appearance at a later court date and individualized to the
defendant before the court.4 5 As noted in Stack v. Boyle, the
[T]raditional right to freedom before conviction permits
the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to
and more states are adding to the list of no-bail offenses.

Id. (quoting Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478, 485 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)).
35. Toblowsky & Quinn, supra note 22, at 282 n.60.

36. Bail Reform Act of 1966,18 U.S.C.

§§ 3146-3152.

37. Lester, supra note 21, at 17.
38. Toblowsky & Quinn, supra note 22, at 283.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting 18 U.S.C.
at 284-85.
at 289.
at 290.

§ 3146(a) (1970)).

43. Toblowsky & Quinn, supra note 22, at 290.

44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
45. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). In Stack, the Court considered habeas claims
by twelve defendants charged under the Smith Act whose bail amounts were originally set at
varying amounts but later set at a high, uniform amount. Id at 3. The Court found bail amounts
are individual considerations designed to assure the presence of that particular defendant. Id. at 5.
Chief Justice Vinson noted, "[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment." Id See also, United States v.

Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926).
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prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.
Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of
struggle, would lose its meaning. 46
Stack provided a basis for the Court later holding that the Eighth
Amendment bail clause guarantee applied to the states. 47
Later statutory changes at the federal level expanded the scope of
considerations on matters of release and detention. 4 8 Now courts'
inquiries include considerations of public safety and the ability to detail
an individual pretrial. 49 This is not without the due process protection of
an adversarial hearing with the opportunity to call witnesses and dispute
the evidence presented.50
B. PretrialDetention in Context

'

This Article will discuss the specific legal context for pretrial
detention and release in Florida, but some comparison to other states is
worthwhile. States vary in the exact way they determine pretrial release
5
and detention decisions, but the arcs of these procedures are similar.
This Article focuses mainly on the presumptions inherent in these
hearings with less attention focused on the timing and location of these
46. Stack, 342 U.S. at 3; see also Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
47. See Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); Pilkinton v. Cir. Ct. of Howell Cnty., 324
F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962), and Robinson, 370
U.S. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2018) ("If, after a hearing pursuant to
the provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any

other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.").
49. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). In Salerno, the Court found the
changes made under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 resulting in pretrial detention were not
impermissible punishments because the Act narrowly limited detention to serious crimes. Id. at

747. The
outweigh
50.
51.

Court found the public safety interest of the government could, under circumstances,
the liberty interest of a defendant. Id at 748.
Id. at 751.
In Georgia, individuals must appear before a judicial officer within 48 hours of a

warrant-less arrest and be informed of the charges among other matters. Ultimately the judicial

officer must "Consider and announce a bail decision, if the offense is not one bailable only by a
superior court judge, or so inform the accused if it is." GA. UNIF. R. MAGISTRATE CT. § 25.1
(2021); In Washington State, preliminary hearings are conducted within 48 hours of arrest. A
presumption of release on personal recognizance unless the-court determines there is a need for

additional assurances of appearance or other safety reasons. The Washington rule also lays out a
series of "Least Restrictive Conditions of Release." WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. R. § 3.2(b)
(2021); Wisconsin statutes do not outline a specific time for an initial appearance, indicating "Any

person who is arrested shall be taken within a reasonable time before a judge in the county in
which the offense was alleged to have been committed." Case law indicates that, appearance
within 48 hours is appropriate. See Wis. STAT. § 970.01 (2021); State v. Koch, 499 N.W.2d 153
(Wis. 1993); and Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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hearings. Given this variation, this Article will look to the federal system
to get an idea of how defendants navigate this process.
Between 24 and 48 hours after arrest, an individual appears before a
judicial officer and is advised of the charges against them. 2 At this
hearing, a judicial officer determines if the person should be released or
not and, if they are released, what appropriate conditions should apply to
their release.5 3 Generally, individuals are released on their own
recognizance (akin to release without condition), released with
conditions, or detained.
The federal statute, like many states' statutes, presumes release on
personal recognizance or an unsecured bond unless conditions or
detention are necessary to secure the appearance of the defendant or
protect the community. 54 Release on recognizance (ROR) is most
common for less serious charges and individuals who have ties to the
community. 55 The statute lays out how to determine if escalating levels
of conditions or detention are appropriate. 56
Judges can release individuals with conditions, typically a surety
bond, to ensure their later appearance. Bail bonds are an industry unto
themselves, with individuals paying, generally, 10% of the bond amount
(a premium) to a bond agent who then provides the remaining amount to
the court.5 7 If an individual does not appear at a later time, the bond is

52. See generally id. (discussing various states' similar approach to scheduling post-arrest

hearings).
53. At the federal level, judges must issue an order determining if a person should be:
(1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured
appearance bond, under subsection (b) of this section;

(2) released on a condition or combination of conditions under subsection (c) of
this section;
(3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release, deportation,
or exclusion under subsection (d) of this section; or
(4) detained under subsection (e) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (2018).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2018).
55. See What Does It Mean To Be Released On Your Own Recognizance?, ABOUTBAIL,
https://www.aboutbail.com/pages/what-does-it-mean-to-be-released-on-your-own-recognizance
[https://perma.cc/J26U-ZNEZ ] (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).

56. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(c) (2018).

57. Bonding agents also offer "payment plans" whereby an individual only needs to come
up with 1% of the total bond amount and then pays the remaining 9% in installments. Once the
case is resolved, regardless of the result, the bonding agent keeps the entirety of the premium.

Shaila Dewan, When Bail is Out of Defendant's Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y. TIMES (June
11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/1 1/us/when-bail-is-out-of-defendants-reach-othercosts-mount.html [https://perma.cc/Q7XY-4CL8].
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58
forfeited and the bonding agent is "on the hook" for the whole amount.
When a defendant's case concludes, the court or clerk returns the bond
amount to the agent, who keeps the premium as a payment for their
services. 59 Reformers attack monetary bail as an economic means of
60
detention, protected by an industry with a vested interest against reform.
Some other conditions include: remain in the custody of a person who
will report to the court any violation, keep a job (or seek employment),
continue or seek education, avoid certain people or places, restrictions on
travel, regular reporting, curfews, surrendering firearms, abstaining from
drugs and alcohol, and of course, a catchall provision deeming a
defendant must "satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary
to assure the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety
of any other person and the community." 61 Conditions and bail bonds can
be an insurmountable obstacle to release.
The statute does, however, presume release of an accused person
"unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will
62 Bail
endanger the safety of any other person or the community."
reforms, like the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act, have emphasized the
importance of release in these high-stake decisions. 63
This process, in action, often takes far less time than explaining it.
Judges set bail in minutes or even seconds." Judges have limited
65
information: often the person's current charges and little more. The
58. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Shaila Dewan, When Bail Feels Less Like Freedom,
More Like Extortion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/bailbonds-extortion.html [https://perma.ccfVP6-T35K].
59. See Bail and Bonds, JUSTIA (Apr. 2018), https://www.justia.com/criminal/bail-bonds/
[https://perma.cc/NED2-WIRF].
60. State after state has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the practice of making
that freedom contingent on money. In response, the bond industry has worked to undermine
reforms and regulations, arguing that commercial bail is still the most efficient and taxpayerfriendly way to keep the public safe and the courts running smoothly. Silver-Greenberg & Dewan,
supra note 58. In some instances, individuals are detained and returned to jail by their bonding
agent for failure to make regular payments. See id.

61.
62.
63.
64.
4, 2018,

18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(i)-(xiv) (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2018).
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 3 (1983).
See Mustafa Z. Mirza, DallasCounty's SecretBail Machine, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept.
3:47 P.M.), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/09/04/dallas-county-s-secret-bail-

machine [https://perma.cc/E28U-GSF6] (exploring the bail process in Dallas County, Texas

where defendants had hearings lasting no more than fifteen seconds without discussion of a
person's ability to pay a bond or appear at a later court date; most of these hearings were conducted
without any public oversight).
65. Jarrett Murphy, Prisoner'sDilemma: How NYC's Bail System Puts Justice on Hold, 31

CrrI LIIUTs INVESTIGATES 1, 14 (2007), http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/BAIL-ISSUE-CITYLIMITS.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD6R-U2XQ] ("[J]udges working arraignments have a tougher
schedule than their counterparts in trial courtrooms. What's more, the judgments made at

2021]1

RE'LEASE ROULETTEh

11

decision boils down to the nature of the offense, weight of evidence,
record of prior flight, and ability to pay. 6 6
Initial appearance hearings are frequently conducted via video
conference, so the judicial officer is not even in the same building, or
even county, as the defendant. 67 Hearings weigh heavily on formality and
efficiency with little room for inquiry or exposition. 68 Judges rely on bail
schedules, essentially a list of charges with corresponding standard bond
amounts, to set bail in many cases. 69
Varying judge assignment further exacerbates the arbitrary nature of
these hearings. Despite bond schedules, bail-setting practices fluctuate
widely, with as much as a 58% divide in the chance of being assigned
cash bail in a felony case. 70 On top of the brevity and arbitrary nature of
these hearings, judges retain a large amount of discretion in making these
decisions as individuals have little appellate recourse. 7 1 This is no
surprise, given the extensive literature on how judge ideology, 7 2 race, 7 3
arraignments are necessarily made on the fly. One quirk of the bail system is that while the
decision on whether to release or set bail is crucial to how the rest of a criminal case plays out,
judges must base their decision on scant, hastily assembled information of questionable

reliability.").
66. Note, CompellingAppearance in Court: Administrationof Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1954).
67. E.g., WIs: STAT. § 970.01 (2020) .(Wisconsin contemplates teleconferenced initial
appearances in their statute: "The initial appearance may be conducted on the record by telephone
or live audiovisual means .... ").
68. See id. at § 970.02 (discussing the formal duties of the judge at the initial appearance
such as informing of charges or right to counsel with no discussion of fact-finding or inquiry into
the facts of the case).
69. John P. Gross, The Right to Counsel but Not the Presenceof Counsel: A Survey of State
CriminalProceduresfor Pre-TrialRelease, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831, 857 (2017).
70. Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You've Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay it? It
May All Depend On Your Judge, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 19, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight
.com/features/youve-been-arrested-will-you-get-bail-can-you-pay-it-it-may-all-depend-on-yourjudge/ [https://perma.cc/4BLB-8UHQ] (exploring the disparities within New York City's
criminal courts, finding a wide-ranging difference between judge's practices).
Bond schedules present another type of problem in the realm of pretrial detention: they do
not contemplate community ties, the weight of the evidence or a person's ability to pay a bond.
One-size-fits-all approaches for bonds run contrary to the principles of individualized bail
determination that the Supreme Court laid out in Stack. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
71. In federal cases, the U.S. Courts of Appeals use an intermediate level of scrutiny to
review the district court's determination of release conditions, a higher level of review than abuse
of discretion but lower than de novo review. See United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 814 (1st
Cir. 1990). This presumes, of course, that the individual detained would have quick access to a
lawyer who is able to file the necessary motion in a timely manner.
72. See Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. CircuitCourts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L.

1457, 1478 (2003); CAss R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
REV.

73. See Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL SCI. 126,
126-36 (1988); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, InstitutionalDynamics on the U.S. Court of
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gender, 74 and experience impact their decision-making. The negative
consequences manifest downstream as well with male and minority
defendants frequently receiving less favorable outcomes than their
female, white counterparts. 75
In many jurisdictions, defendants have the right to a hearing to review,
76
reduce, or modify their conditions of release set at initial appearance.
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299,

299-330 (2004); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate
Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 167-83 (2013); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges'
Race andJudicialDecisionMaking: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 Soc. SCI. Q. 749,

749-64 (2001).
74. See Jilda M. Aliotta, Justice O'Connorand the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine
Voice, 78 JUDICATURE 232,232-35 (1995); Christina L. Boyd et al., Untanglingthe CausalEffects

of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCi. 389, 389-411 (2010); Donald R. Songer et al., A
Reappraisalof Diversificationin the FederalCourts: Gender Effects in the Courts ofAppeals, 56
J. POL. 425, 425-39 (1994); Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal
Bench: Clinton's District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RSCH. Q. 137, 147-50 (2000); Gregory C.

Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1377-1500 (1998); Lydia Tiede et al., JudicialAttributes
and Sentencing-DeviationCases: Do Sex, Race, and PoliticsMatter?, 31 JUsT. SYS. J. 249, 24972 (2010); Susan W. Johnson et al., The Gender Influence on US District Court Decisions:
Updating the TraditionalJudge Attribute Model, 29 J. WOMEN POL. & POL'Y 497, 497-526
(2008); John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of TrialJudges, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI.
308,308-22(1981); Claire S.H. Lim et al., Do Judges ' CharacteristicsMatter? Ethnicity, Gender,
and Partisanship in Texas State Trial Courts, 18 AM. L. & ECoN. REV. 302, 302-57 (2016);
Donald R. Songer & Kelly A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in

State Supreme Courts, 81 Soc. SCI. Q. 750, 750-62 (2000).

&

75. See Meghan Sacks et al., Sentenced to PretrialDetention: A Study of Bail Decisions
and Outcomes, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 661, 661-81 (2015); Angela K. Reitler et al., The Effects of
Legal and Extralegal Factors on Detention Decisions in U.S. DistrictCourts, 30 JUST. Q. 340,
340-68 (2013); Cynthia E. Jones, "Give Us Free": Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail
Determinations, N.Y.U. J. LEGiS. & PUB. POL'Y 919, 919-64 (2013); John Wooldredge et al.,
Ecological Contributors to Disparities in Bond Amounts and PretrialDetention, 63 CRiME
DELINQ. 1682, 1682-1711 (2017); Tina L. Freiburger & Carly M. Hilinski, The Impact of Race,
Gender, and Age on the PretrialDecision, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 318, 318-34 (2010); Stephen
Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A
Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 873, 873-908
(2003); Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Testfor Race Discriminationin Bail Setting, 46
STAN. L. REV. 987, 987-1047 (1994); Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and PretrialDetention in Federal
Court:Indirect Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage,U. KAN. L. REV. 879,879-902 (2009); K.B.
Turner & James B. Johnson, The Effect ofGender on the JudicialPretrialDecision ofBailA mount

Set, 70 FED. PROB. 56, 56-62 (2006).
76. E.g., WIs. STAT. § 969.08(1) (2020) (Wisconsin provides for a hearing for those still in
custody after 72 hours of arrest. "Upon petition by the state or the defendant, the court before
which the action is pending may increase or reduce the amount of bail or may alter other
conditions of release or the bail bond or grant bail if it has been previously revoked. Except as

provided in sub. (5), a defendant for whom conditions of release are imposed .and who after 72
hours from the time of initial appearance before a judge continues to be detained in custody as a
result of the defendant's inability to meet the conditions of release, upon application, is entitled to
have the conditions reviewed by the judge of the court before whom the action against the
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Some states provide for a quick hearing relative to other matters before
the court. As we will see in the next section, even a few days delay in
considering a reduction or modification can result in irreparable harm.
C. PretrialDetention Numbers on the Rise
Understanding the progression of and current state of the law is but
one part of understanding pretrial detention. As the data shows, Florida
is not alone in having escalating levels of pretrial detention in urban and
rural counties. The result of this evolution of the law can be seen in the
numbers. From 2000 to 2014, "95% of the growth in the overall jail
inmate population (123,500) was due to the increase in the unconvicted
population (117,700 inmates)." 7 7
Again, 74% of individuals detained in county jails have not been
convicted of any crime, amounting to 555,000 people who have not been
convicted or sentenced yet. 7 8 As we know from Salerno, public safety is
a primary justification for pretrial detention, 79 and yet of the 555,000
unconvicted inmates, only 27% have been charged with a violent crime. 80
The rest are detained on property, drug, or public order offenses.81 While
these charges are violations of the law, what public safety aim is gained
by their continued detention? Comparatively, the United States detains
almost twice as many individuals pretrial than any other country in the
world. 82
Why the rapid rise and high rate of pretrial incarceration? One culprit
could be the monetary bail system, which requires defendants to pay a
certain, often standardized, amount to allow for their release. 83 In 1990
only 53% of defendants needed to post money bail, a proportion which

defendant is pending."); WASH. R. CRI. P. 3.2(j)(1)-2) (Washington State only requires this
review to occur within a "reasonable time": "Review of Conditions. (1) At any time after the
preliminary appearance, an accused who is being detained due to failure to post bail may move
for reconsideration of bail. In connection with this motion, both parties may present information
by proffer or otherwise. If deemed necessary for a fair determination of the issue, the court may

direct the taking of additional testimony. (2) A hearing on the motion shall be held within a
reasonable time.").
77. Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, U.S. DEP'T JUST., Bull.

No. 248629, June 2015, at

1, 1.

78. Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 1.

79. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. RoY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRE-TRIAL/REMAND IMPRISONMENT LIST (3d ed. 2017).
83. Patrick Liu et al., The Economics of Bail and PretrialDetention, HAMILTON PROJECT,
at 3 (Dec. 2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/BailFineReform_EA_121818_

6PM.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2L6-RKUY].
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increased to 72% in 2009.84 The median bail for felony defendants among
the 75 largest counties in the United States was $10,000 in 2009.85
How does the high price of bail impact individuals, considering that
bail bonding agents can help post a surety bond? The premium of a
$10,000 bail order is $1,000.:6 Almost 40% of adults in the United States
cannot afford a $400 emergency without holding a credit card balance or
borrowing from family or friends. 87 Twelve percent of adults would be
unable to pay this type of expense at all. 88 For 12% of adults a $4,000
bond could bar their release regardless of their culpability and the
presumption of innocence.
A 2008 study of nonfelony arrests in New York City revealed in 87%
of cases where bail was $1,000 or less, defendants were not able to post
bail at their arraignment. 89 This resulted in an average pretrial detention
of 15.7 days, which, as explained in the next Part, costs more than just a
defendant's time. 90 Most of these charges (71.1%) were non-violent, nonweapons related. 91
D. Costs of PretrialDetention
Rates of pretrial detention have received increased attention from
92
reformers, especially outside of Florida, in the last few years. The
pretrial stage is important because of its numerous legal and practical
implications. As noted in the Introduction, taxpayers spend nearly nine
billion dollars annually detaining individuals who, in the eyes of the law,
are innocent. 9 3 Pretrial detention can range from 50 to 200 days for those
unable to post bail. 94
84. Id. at 5.
85. Brian A. Reeves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009-StatisticalTables,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., at 1, 19 (Dec. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf

[https://perma.cc/UZ9X-SKP9].
86. Liu et al., supra note 83, at 8.
87. Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2018 - May 2019, FED. RES.
(last updated May 28, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-economic-well-

being-of-us-households-in-2018-dealing-with-unexpected-expenses.htm [https://permacc/53ZB
-P6H8].
88. Id.
89. Jamie Fellner, The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, H.R. WATCH, Dec. 2, 2010, at 2, https://www.hrw.org/
report/2010/12/02/price-freedom/bail-and-pretrial-detention-low-income-nonfelony-defendantsnew [https://perma.cc/ZS52-URTS].
90. Id; see infra Part 11.
91. Fellner, supra note 89, at 2.
92. See Bednadette Rabuy, PretrialDetention Costs $13.6 Billion Each Year, PRISON POL'Y

2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/02/07/pretrialcost/ [https://
perma.cc/27GA-AYFH].
INITIATIVE (Feb. 7,

.

93. Holder, supra note 6.
94. Liu et al., supra note 83, at 5.
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One group for whom pretrial detention results in high taxpayer
expense is the homeless population. A 2014 report on homelessness in
Central Florida found that detaining chronically homeless individuals
cost Seminole, Osceola, and Orange counties $641,791 annually. 9 5 In
Osceola County the study focused on 37 individuals who were arrested
1,250 times over ten years. 9 6 Each arrest cost the county $104 per booking
with an average of 49.5 days spent in custody and an average per day, per
person cost of $80 to house these individuals. 9 7
The financial impact does not end with taxpayer expense. In this time,
individuals detained pretrial find themselves facing weakened family and
social ties and the loss of jobs and housing. 9 8 Being absent from their
family also means individuals detained pretrial can risk losing custody of
their children, even if they are primary caregivers. 99 These personal
hardships are felt more acutely by people of color.' 00 African American
men pay 35% higher bail amounts than white men with .Hispanic men
paying 19% higher bail amounts than white men.' 0 1 Pretrial detention
decreases employment and receipt of government benefits.10 2
95. Gregory A. Shinn, The Cost of Long-Term Homelessness in Central Florida: The

Current Crisis and the Economic Impact of Providing Sustainable Housing Solutions, RETHINK
HOMELESSNESS, 2014, at 13, http://www.impacthomelessness.org/resources/docs/eis/EcoImpactReport-LOW-RES.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGS4-BCMS].
96. Id. at 22.

97. Id.
98. Alfred Allan et al., An ObservationalStudy of Bail Decision-Making, 12 PSYCHIATRY
PSYCH. & L. 319, 319-33 (2005).
99. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of MisdemeanorPretrialDetention,

69 STAN. L. REv. 711, 711-94 (2017).
100. See Jones, supra note 75, at 937.

101. Alex Emslie, Kamala Harrisand Rand PaulIntroduce National Bail Reform Bill, CAL.
REPORT (July 20, 2017), https://www.kqed.org/news/11577944/kamala-harris-and-rand-paulintroduce-national-bail-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/WZ8N-B9M5].
102. Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of PretrialDetention on Conviction, Future Crime, and
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECoN. REv. 201, 201-40
(2018). Dobbie, Goldin and Yang examine the economic impact of pretrial detention using data
from over 420,000 defendant's case. They connect tax and administrative tax records to case
outcomes. Interestingly they find that pretrial detention has no net effect on future crime. A
criminal defense lawyer noted:
Our clients work in service-level positions where if you're gone for a day, you
lose your job. People in need of caretaking-the elderly, the young-are left
without caretakers. People who live in shelters, where if they miss their curfews,
they lose their housing. Folks with immigration concerns are quicker to be put
on the immigration radar. So when our clients have bail set, they suffer on the
inside, they worry about what's happening on the outside, and when they get out,
they come back to a world that's more difficult than the already difficult situation
that they were in before.
Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TImES, Aug. 13, 2015 (Magazine), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/MING5-RRLN].
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Pretrial detention has legal consequences as well. Individuals
incarcerated have less access to their attorneys, either via phone or faceto-face and experience difficulty in mounting effective legal strategies
and defenses. 0 3 Practically, individuals detained cannot find witnesses
and seek out potentially exonerating or mitigating evidence from a jail
cell. Pretrial detention weakens the bargaining power of defendants
during pretrial negotiations. 104 As a result of these numerous challenges,
"a detained person may plead guilty-even if innocent-simply to get
105
out of jail."
The disadvantage of litigating from the jailhouse translates into
harsher consequences as well. It is sad but true: "A commonly noted irony
of American misdemeanor justice is that, despite the widespread
implementation of bail reform. .. many more defendants are imprisoned
before trial than are imprisoned after conviction .... "106 A study of
Philadelphia courts found "pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase in
the likelihood of being convicted on at least one charge." 1 07 This increase
can be explained by defendants pleading guilty to end their detention
when other dispositions, like diversion, plea negotiations leading to
dismissal, and acquittal could lead to better outcomes. 108 Being detained
pretrial also translates to a higher level of jail sentences, and, in one study,
to a 42% increase in sentence length.1 09 As previously discussed, pretrial

103. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN
AMERICAN

JUSTICE 11 (1979); see also Jones, supra note 75, at 938.

104. See Tobolowsky & Quinn, supranote 22, at 275 n.39.
105. Heaton et al., supra note 99, at 714 (citation omitted).

106. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 931, 931-1050 (1983) ("If a
defendant is denied or cannot make bail, the length of pretrial detention may approach or even
dwarf the likely sentence after trial. Thus, detained defendants strike bargains for time served
instead of awaiting their day in court. Plea bargaining, then, often happens in the shadow not of

trial but of bail decisions.").
107. Megan T. Stevenson, Distortionof Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 512 (2018).
108. Id. at 512-13. Even an acquittal can be accompanied with negative consequences,
however, because
pretrial detention can approach or exceed the punishment that a court would
impose after trial. So even an acquittal at trial can be a hollow victory, as there

is no way to restore the days -already spent in jail. The defendant's best-case
scenario becomes not zero days in jail, but the length of time already served.
Stephanos Bibas, PleaBargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2463, 2492-

93 (2004).
109. Anne Rankin, The Effect of PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 649 (1964).
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detention's financial consequences pervade the process, with defendants
detained pretrial carrying 41% higher levels of court costs and fees.1 10
Merely being present in a jail while awaiting trial translates to a scary
proposition. Because of "deplorable conditions and overcrowding in
some local jails, pretrial detainees are exposed to diseases, physical
violence, sexual assault, and face a very real risk of death.""'1 High rates
of pretrial detention can have dangerous consequences in the face of a
pandemic as well.
The conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbate the
problems with massive pretrial detention." 2 Detainees face conditions
where social distancing and other common practices are impossible. 1 3
Some Florida jails have resorted to large releases of nonviolent inmates
to prevent the spread of the virus.1 4 Those that remain in custody face
delays due to closed court systems, restricted access to their counsel, and
curtailed due process rights." 5 Despite some compassionate release,
large outbreaks of COVID-19 have occurred in county correctional
facilities.1 16
II. RURAL-URBAN JUSTICE DISTINCTIONS

The Equal Protection Clause demands that individuals be treated
equally." 7 When geography dictates differential treatment, systems of
justice run afoul of equal justice principles. Scholars have scrutinized the
110. Id. "Since most people who are detained pretrial are detained due to an inability to pay
bail, this provides support for poverty-trap theories of criminal justice. While the median
defendant must pay only $250 to secure release, those who are convicted are expected to pay an
average of $611 in court fees. The monetary bail system acts as a sort of regressive taxation: those
who cannot afford to pay for pretrial release are required to pay a larger portion of the court's
expenses." Stevenson, supra note 107, at 513.
111. Jones, supra note 75, at 937.
112. Sarah Turberville & Katherine Hawkins, PretrialDetention in a Pandemic,PROJECT ON
GOv'T OVERSIGHT (June 23, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/06/pretrial-detention-ina-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/S7GQ-ZHTR].
113. Id. (Turberville and Hawkins note that eight of the 10 largest COVID-19 outbreaks are
in correctional facilities, in part because of the woefully inadequate medical care at these

facilities.).
114. Kelly Wiley, Since March, Hundreds of Nonviolent Offenders Released to Control
Virus Spread at Duval Jail, NEWS 4 JAx (updated June 30, 2020, 6:40 PM),
https://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2020/06/30/since-march-hundreds-of-nonviolent-offendersout-of-duval-jail-to-control-virus-spread/ [https://perma.cc/BC5D-9SLF (reporting that Duval
County released 500 nonviolent offenders from their pretrial detention center from mid-March

through the end of June in 2020).
115. Turberville & Hawkins, supra note 112.

116. Id
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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divide between rural and urban locations in the United States for decades
to discern why these locations have different attitudes and see different
results. 1 8 Rural-urban distinctions abound in social science literature,
20
with differences in political polarization," 9 voting patterns,1
religiosity, 12 1 delivery of local government services,122 rates of failures to
124
appear (FTAs),1 23 and support for environmental protection.
Historically, rural crime trends received less attention because urban
crime rates tended to be substantially higher.' 2 1 Scholars have suggested
this scant attention to rural justice systems is harmful to policymaking
and that understanding the differences in rural and urban justice is

necessary.1 2 6

Why probe the differences in rural and urban justice in pretrial
detention, especially in Florida? Well, rural and urban distinctions
emerge in other criminal justice contexts such as sentencing, probation
and juvenile justice. Given the wide-ranging impact of these distinctions,
118. Eileen Patten, The Black-White and Urban-Rural Divides in Perceptions of Racial
Fairness, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/

28/the-black-white-and-urban-rural-divides-in-perceptions-of-racial-fairness/
3VRK-AJU5].

[https://perma.cc/

119. Dante J. Scala & Kenneth M. Johnson, PoliticalPolarizationalong the Rural-Urban
Continuum? The Geography of the PresidentialVote, 2000-2016, 672 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.

& Soc. Sci. 162, 163-84 (2017).
120. Paige Kelly & Linda Lobao, The Social Bases ofRural-UrbanPoliticalDivides: Social
Status, Work and Sociocultural Beliefs, 84 RURAL Soc. 669, 669-705 (2019) (finding that the
variation in social status accounts for differences in voting choices as well as sociocultural values
and beliefs).
121. H. Paul Chalfant & Peter L. Heller, Rural/Urban Versus Regional Diferences in

Religiosity, 33 REV. RELIGIOUS RSCH. 76, 76-86 (1991) (examining rural-urban impacts on
variations in religiosity, finding differences in religious practice and sentiment between regions
and rural-urban locations).

122. Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Rural-UrbanDifferences in Privatization:Limits to
the Competitive State, 21 ENV'T & PLAN. C: GOV'T & POL'Y 703, 703-18 (2003) (finding that
cooperation, rather than market solutions, may provide an alternative to privatization in rural and
disadvantaged communities where market-based solutions are less prevalent).
123. Brian H. Bornstein et al., Reducing Courts' Failure-to-Appear Rate by Written
Reminders, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 70 (2013).
124. George D. Lowe & Thomas K. Pinhey, Rural-Urban Differences in Support for
EnvironmentalProtection, 47 RURAL SOC. 114 (1982) (comparing multiple hypotheses as to why

rural people show consistently lower levels of support for environmental protection; socialization
of urban dwellers tended to positively influence support for social solutions to environmental
problems).
125. Wojciech Cebulak, Why Rural Crime and Justice Really Matter, 19 J. POLICE & CRIM.
PSYCH. 71, 71-81 (2004) (finding a steady increase of rural crime from the late 1960s to early
1990s in spite of urban increases and declines and that some crimes occur only in rural settings
which helps account for this increase).
126. Ralph A. Weisheit & L. Edward Wells, Rural Crime and Justice: Implications for
Theory and Research, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 379, 379-97 (1996) (arguing that applying urban

models of social organization to rural settings is ineffective and needs to be reassessed).

20211

RELEASE ROULET7i

19

it is important to see the differences manifested elsewhere in the system
first.
A. Rural-Urban Sentencing
Sentencing decisions are among the most studied in the criminal
justice context, in part, due to the quantifiable and deliberative aspects of
these decisions.1 2 7 There is one sentencing judge in one jurisdiction with
one set of lawyers and one defendant whose charges are specific and
defined. This permits social scientists to easily classify and analyze data.
While the same individual defendant may appear before the same judge
for a pretrial detention decision and sentencing, a sentencing judge has
access to more information, from both the prosecutor and the defense
attorney, as well as filings in the case. 12 8
Research has shown "ostensibly similar offenders are punished
differently, depending on whether they were convicted in urban rather
than rural counties."1 2 9 Myers and Talrico's research revealed that
urbanization had a large effect in Georgia courts in the 1980s.1 30
Urbanization was found to be a "contextual determinant of differential
treatment." 13 1
Another study found that the distinction between rural and urban
sentencing contexts translated to urban courts making sentencing
decisions based on legal factors and rural courts placing emphasis on
extralegal matters. 13 2 Legal factors include both the charges the defendant
127. See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22

CRIME AND JUST. 303, 303-62 (1997); Frank O. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime
Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 9 (2001); Cassia
Spohn, Race and Sentencing Disparity in 4 REFORM[NG CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE ON BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM 169, 169-86
(Erik Luna ed., 2017); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What's Wrong with
Sentencing Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. 1447 (2016).
128. At a sentencing hearing, the judge can have more time to contemplate their decision,
and the defendant likely has the assistance of counsel to present mitigating evidence. Sentencing
hearings post-trial may provide the clearest picture of the evidence and appropriateness of a given
sentence.
129. Martha A. Myers & Susette M. Talarico, Urban Justice, Rural Injustice? Urbanization
and Its Effect on Sentencing, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 367, 367 (1986). See also John Hagan, Criminal
Justice in Rural and Urban Communities: A Study of the Bureaucratization of Justice, 55 SOC.
FORCES 597, 597, 609 (1977); Carl E. Pope, The Influence of Social and Legal Factors on

Sentencing Dispositions: A Preliminary Analysis of Offender Based Transaction Statistics, 4 J.
CRIM. JUST. 203, 217-18 (1976); Lorne Tepperman, The Effects of Court Size on Organization
and Procedure, 10 CAN. REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 346, 346-65; Terance D. Miethe & Charles

A. Moore, Racial Differences in Criminal Processing: The Consequences of Model Selection on
Conclusions About DifferentialTreatment, 27 SOC. Q. 217, 217-37 (1986).
130. Myers & Talarico, supra note 129, at 381.
131. /d.
132. Thomas L. Austin, The Influence of Court Location on Type of Criminal Sentence: The
Rural-Urban Factor, 9 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 305, 305 (1981).
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pled to and their attendant criminal history. 3 Extralegal factors include
age, race, sex and other socioeconomic factors.1 34 In theory, legal factors
would provide more stability in sentencing outcomes, with the
application of rules and process to a defendant's criminal history and
charge.13 5 In the rural context, these extralegal factors, can lead to harsher
sentences.136
B. Rural-UrbanProbation
Probation administration has some similarities to the pretrial detention
process as well. Pretrial detention decisions are made without as much
information as probation processes but, much like sentencing, their
similarities are important. Probation officers take in defendants and
supervise their activities, much like a pretrial release program.
Upon examination, intake in a midwestern state's rural and urban
counties shared many similarities in the administration of probation, with
comparable sex and education levels of offenders. 3 7 Despite the
programs being administered at the local level, there were consistent
sentences and perceived treatment differences emerged between rural and
urban counties.1 3 8 Rural counties had more fees, restitution and electronic
monitoring requirements on sentenced defendants.1 39 In contrast, urban
14 0
counties were more likely to require community service.
C. Rural-UrbanJuvenile Justice
Juvenile justice is another area where we see judges making similar
decisions regarding pretrial detention and see a clear rural-urban divide.
Juvenile judges, unlike regular criminal judges, are often tasked with very
child-specific decisions that have wide reaching consequences outside of
the courtroom. The outputs for a juvenile case are similar in some ways
to pretrial detention, with a preference for supervision rather than
detention.
A study of Minnesota courts found a rural-urban divide in juvenile
justice.1 4 1 In more heterogenous and diverse urban counties there are
42
more formal, bureaucratized and due-process oriented justice systems.1
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id.

137. Thomas Ellsworth & Ralph A. Weisheit, The Supervision and Treatment of Offenders

on Probation: UnderstandingRural and Urban Differences, 77 PRISON J. 209, 209-28 (1997).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 224.
140. Id.
141. Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in
Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 157 (1991).

142. Id. at 156.
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This formality leads to more severity in detention and sentencing
practices. 4 3 Rural counties are more homogenous and have fewer formal
juvenile sanctions and less severe treatment.144
The contrast between juvenile justice and sentencing outcomes poses
an interesting question: Why do we see more severe treatment in urban
contexts in one set of decisions but the reverse in another? Is this due to
bureaucratization or the approach to the law? Discovering the difference
is only the first part of the equation.
D. Rural-UrbanDistinctionsin PretrialDetention
Insights from sentencing, probation and juvenile justice are
informative to understanding what differences exist between rural and
urban counties in pretrial detention. The bureaucratic resource difference
between rural and urban criminal justice present in those contexts
translates similarly to pretrial detention decisions. Resources available to
urban courts in court administration, probation cases, and juvenile cases
allow judges to make more systematic decisions where rural courts often
have to rely on more intuition-based decision making.
Pretrial detention decisions can benefit from resources to evaluate the
accused's ability to pay, risk of failing to appear and criminal history.
While bureaucratic decision making has the drawback of smoothing over
nuance, it allows policy makers to deploy consistent frameworks across
cases. As we will see in the data, counties with resources related to
pretrial release detain far fewer individuals at usually a far lower cost.
III. DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS

Prior empirical studies of bail have been rare and generally focused
on state and local data.1 4 5 Our original data thus represent a novel source
for evaluating important but understudied federal bail decisions.
Substantive discussions of the state of the law are necessary to
understanding pretrial detention in the rural-urban context in Florida but
do not go far enough. In order to fully understand the practical
143. Id. at 157.
144. Id. at 162.
145. E.g., Meghan Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Pretrial Detention and Guilty Pleas: If
They CannotAfford Bail They Must be Guilty, 25 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 265 (2012); Meghan Sacks
& Alissa R. Ackerman, Bail and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention Lead to Harsher
Punishment?, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 59 (2014); Meghan Sacks et al., Sentenced to Pretrial
Detention: A Study of Bail Decisions and Outcomes, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 661 (2015); John
Wooldredge et al., Ecological Contributors to Disparities in Bond Amounts and Pretrial
Detention, 63 CRIME & DEL[NQ. 1682 (2017); Rod V. Hissong & Gerald Wheeler, The Role of
PrivateLegal Representationandthe ImplicitEffect of Defendants'Demographic Characteristics
in Setting Bail and Obtaining PretrialRelease, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 708 (2017); Arpit
Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 U. CHI. J.

LEG.

STUD.

471 (2016).
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implications of the processes currently in place, as well as the potential
solutions, we need to engage with the data presently available. By
comparing pretrial detention rates among counties with and without
pretrial release programs, a clearer picture will emerge, with nuance only
empirical analysis can provide.
The data examined in this Article comes from a variety of sources in
order to capture a robust picture of what pretrial detention rates look like
nationwide and within Florida. While Florida does regularly produce data
on case names, outcomes, and other factors, pretrial release and bail data
are spotty and inconsistent. In 2018, the Florida Legislature passed a law
creating a more complete statewide criminal justice database.1 4 6 This new
data would reveal individual case and bond amounts, clearly report jail
and prison populations, and note prosecutorial patterns, among many
other things.' 7 Sadly, this database is currently unavailable and
seemingly bogged down with extensive delays. 14 8
A. Vera Data
To examine county-level pretrial detention and other jail-related
information I utilized a dataset from the Vera Institute of Justice. The
Vera Institute of Justice collects a variety of data related to criminal cases
across the United States.1 4 9 I utilized the Incarceration Trends dataset for
146. Fla. Stat.

§ 900.05 (2018). The new database will collect 140 data points for each case,

standardizing collection across counties and publishing the data.

Florida SB 1392 (2018) amended Fla. Stat 900.05 to read:
(1) LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT.-It is the intent of the
Legislature to create a model of uniform criminal justice data collection by
requiring local and state criminal justice agencies to report complete, accurate,

and timely data, and making such data available to the public. The Legislature
finds that it is an important state interest to implement a uniform data collection
process and promote criminal justice data transparency.
The changes also create uniform arrest and charging documents and standardize definitions across

jurisdictions.
147. Id.
148. AndrewPantazi, A New Effort was Supposed to Make Florida'sCriminal Justice Data
Radically Transparent. So Far, It's Failed, PALM BEACH POST (July 2, 2020, 3:02 PM),
https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20200702/new-effort-was-supposed-to-make-floridars
quos-criminal-justice-data-radically-transparent-so-far-itrsquos-failed/] [https://perma.cc/4HHP-

CQLQ]. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) missed several deadlines to
publish this database which may result in some state agencies losing funding.
149. Vera's research focuses on criminal justice issues, ranging from policing, immigration
legal systems, corrections, housing, and education. They aim to use data to support policy
changes. Vera also outlines its methods more specifically in JACOB KANG-BROWN, VERA INST. OF
JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS: DATA AND METHODS FOR HISTORICAL JAIL POPULATIONS IN U.S.

1970-2014 (2015), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/
Publications/in-our-own-backyard-confronting-growth-and-disparities-in-americanjails/legacy
downloads/incarceration-trends-data-and-methods.pdf [https://permacc/UG8F-A24R].
COUNTIES,
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this Article.'5 0 "This dataset was assembled using information collected
by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS),
supplemented with data from state departments of correction when
federal data is not available.""' Vera also used the Census of Jails (COJ),
conducted every five to eight years, and Annual Survey of Jails (ASJ) to
fill out the information.15 2 The Incarceration Trends data is recorded at
the county-level from 1970 to 2017.153
The variables from the Incarceration Trends dataset used below
incorporate County Jail Population, Pretrial Jail Population and resident
population data. 154 County Jail Population is defined as the "average daily
population and excludes federal jails and inmates in local jails held for
federal authorities, such as U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
and U.S. Marshals Service."15 5 The Pretrial Jail Population number is a
subset of the Total Jail Population, including only those who are
considered "unconvicted" in the BJS data on June 30th of each year. 156
Because the Total Jail Population is an average of the year on the whole
and the Pretrial Jail Population is only a snapshot, they provide slightly
different statistics as jail populations fluctuate day-to-day. 157 Vera's
population data comes from the U.S. Census as well as the American
Community Survey (ACS).158 Specifically, "[t]he project uses intercensal
150.

VERA

INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS

https://github.com/vera-institute/incarceration_trends

visited Aug. 12, 2020).
151. VERA INST.

OF JUST.,

INCARCERATION

DATASET AND DOCUMENTATION,

[https://perma.cc/E26A-7CDH]
TRENDS

DATASET:

(last

CODEBOOK 4 (2020),

https://github.com/vera-institute/incarceration_trends/blob/master/incarcerationtrends-Code
book.pdf?raw-true [https://perma.cc/PN6P-58VX] (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
152. See id. at 5-6. Vera notes:
The ASJ was fielded 27 times between 1985 and 2016 and captures data for a
sample of a few hundred jails; in 2015, the sample was approximately 800

counties, which included the 250 largest jails. The COJ has only been fielded 10
times since 1970-in 1970, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1999, 2005, 2006,
and 2013-but captures data for all counties. Data for years that counties did not
supply data (through the ASJ or COJ) were interpolated ... assuming a constant
rate of change between the years when data was provided.
JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS IN LOCAL JAILS AND
STATE PRISONS: DATA AND METHODS FOR STATE FAcT SHEETS 4 (2019),

https://www.vera.org/

downloads/publications/incarceration-trends-fact-sheets-data-and-methods.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DH4Q-AECF]. "Six states (Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont)
do not participate in the U.S. jail survey or census because they run unified state systems that

combine
153.
154.
155.
156.

prisons and jails." Id. at 4.
CODEBOOK, supra note 151, at 6.

Id. at 8, 10.
Id.

See KANG-BROWN ET AL., supra note
157. Id.
158. KANG-BROWN, supra note 149, at 5.

152, at 4.
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population estimates for individual years between 1970 and 2010, and
2014 post-censual estimates, all available from U.S. Census."1 59
The primary output from the Vera data I rely on is the Pretrial Jail
incarceration rate. This statistic, rather than a raw population count of
individuals detained in the jail, allows a comparison between counties
regardless of population. The Pretrial Jail incarceration rate is the number
of inmates detained pretrial per 100,000 residents aged 1544.160
B. OPPAGA Reports
In addition to the Vera Incarceration trends dataset, I compiled a
limited, unique dataset from Florida legislative reports produced by the
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability
(OPPAGA). Since 1994, OPPAGA has provided statewide reports and
evaluations of programs for the Florida Legislature.' 6 1
One of the many areas of OPPAGA's engagement is criminal justice.
In 2008, Florida's Right-to-Know Act came into effect, requiring
counties with pretrial release programs to regularly report information to
OPPAGA.1 62 Pretrial release programs are defined as "an entity, public
or private, that conducts investigations of pretrial detainees, makes
pretrial release recommendations to a court, and electronically monitors
and supervises pretrial defendants. However, the term 'pretrial release
program' shall not apply to the Department of Corrections."1 63
OPPAGA requires weekly information updates on how the pretrial
release programs were funded, the criminal histories and charges of
defendants, FTAs, arrests, and compliance with reporting guidelines.14
In addition to weekly reports, each program must also provide a detailed
annual report by March 31st of each year.1 6 5
To provide a snapshot of the state's pretrial release programs, I
compiled data from 2014 to 2017, identifying the number of accepted
defendants, served defendants, total county pretrial program budget,
warrants issued, FTAs, types of monitoring, assessment of fees and

159. Id.
160. See Incarceration Trends, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://trends.vera.org/ [https://
perma.cc/H7M5-A8VB] (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
161. About OPPAGA, OPPAGA, https://oppaga.fl.gov/About [https://perma.cc/R8SFECWK] (last visited Aug. 12, 2020). OPPAGA research is used to assist legislators and other state
officials in policy planning and budgeting.
162. FLA. STAT. § 907.043(3)(a) (2020). Specifically, "[e]ach pretrial release program must
prepare a register displaying information that is relevant to the defendants released through such
a program. A copy of the register must be located at the office of the clerk of the circuit court in
the county where the program is located and must be readily accessible to the public." Id.
163. FLA. STAT. § 907.043(2)(b) (2020).
164. FLA. STAT. § 907.043(3)(b) (2020).

165.

FLA.

STAT.

§ 907.043(4)a)-(b) (2020).
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recipient of fee payments. Between 2014 and 2017, twenty-eight counties
reported their pretrial program data.' 6 6
C. Populationand Arrest Data
Supplementing the data listed above, I added additional' population
and arrest data from Florida's Uniform Crime Reports from 2014 to
2017.167 The arrest data breaks down population and arrest rates by
Florida county. I will deploy these primarily in the analysis of program
effectiveness of pretrial release.
D. Rural-UrbanClassiication
The Incarceration Trends dataset and the OPAGGA reports contain a
great deal of quantitative data that does not break counties down into
rural-urban classifications. In order to accurately capture the division
between rural and urban counties, I used the 2013 National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS) Urban-Rural Classification Scheme for
Counties.1 68 Their classification scheme breaks down counties into
metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan counties based on population and
proximity to metropolitan areas. 169 In short, nonmetropolitan counties
comprise of counties with less than 50,000 residents. For purposes of our
analysis, metropolitan counties are considered "urban" and
nonmetropolitan are "rural." All counties nationally were coded with a 0
or 1 with 1 indicating a rural county.
IV. PRETRIAL RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE ACROSS STATES

As discussed above, the difference between criminal justice in urban
and pretrial counties is astounding. Zip codes, more often than not, dictate
the type of justice meted out to defendants. This difference manifests
itself clearly in the pretrial detention context.

166. OPPAGA,

REPORT NO. 18-06, COUNTY PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS: CALENDAR

YEAR 2017 (Nov. 2018), https://oppaga.fl.gov/Products/ReportDetail?m=18-06 [https:/perma.cc

/G3TL-7TFK]
FLA. DEP'T OF L. ENF'T, FLORIDA'S UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS DATA,

168. See

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH

PREVENTION, SERIES 2 No.

166,

&

HUM.

https://www.fdle.

[https://perma.cc/ZPK4-KLUV] (last

SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL

2013 NCHS URBAN-RURAL

&

167.

state.fl.us/FSAC/Data-Statistics/UCR-Arrest-Data.aspx
visited Aug. 12, 2020).

CLASSIFICATION

SCHEME FOR

COUNTIES 2 (Apr. 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_02/sr02_166.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W6Y3-D4K9]
169. The report further places counties into six subdivided categories: within "metropolitan":
large central metro, large fringe metro, medium metro and small metro; within "nonmetropolitan":

micropolitan (10,000-49,999) and noncore. While the six categories provide more refined
distinctions, the refined distinction could scrub the data of cognizable differences. Id.
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Let us get to the numbers. This section primarily serves as a snapshot
of what trends in pretrial detention look like nationwide in order to
understand how Florida fits (and does not fit) into these larger patterns.
As we will see, over the last thirty years pretrial detention rates have
increased nationwide in all counties.
A. Nationwide PretrialDetention Rates
Figure 1 displays the pretrial jail population per 100,000 people (aged
15-64) averaged across states and over time. Each state is represented as
a whole for each year. By utilizing a box plot we can see the general
trends, the range between quartiles and the emergence of outliers.
Figure 1

Pretrial Jail Rate (by State)
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Figure 1: This box plot displays the median and quartile breakdown of the pretrial jail rate for
each state from 1990-2017. Each state is considered one unit for purposes of this graph.

In 1990, the mean pretrial jail population was 91.40 per 100,000
residents, with a minimum average of 30.64 and a maximum of 258.54.
Over a decade the mean increased nearly 60%, to 153.61. The rate
continued to increase over time, arriving at a mean of 277.67 in 2017 with
an astonishing statewide maximum rate of 814.37.170 The rate changes
170. The outliers for 2017 are Louisiana with a pretrial incarceration rate of 814.37, Texas
with 639.95, and New Mexico with 629.34. See supra Figure. 1.
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take population into account, meaning that in twenty-seven years the
average rate tripled. While there may be a multitude of explanations for
this drastic increase, our goal is to discern whether there is a rural-urban
divide in detention.
B. Nationwide Rural vs. Urban PretrialRates
This leads to more questions: Do rural and urban counties track with
the national rate or do they diverge? Before comparing rates, we should
take note of the number of urban and rural counties in the United States.
Table 1 shows the division of the nation's 3,139 counties. Within the
United States rural counties outnumber urban counties almost two-toone.
Table 1: This table lists the number andpercentage of urban and
ruralcounties nationwide.

URBAN COUNTIES
RURAL
TOTAL

NUMBER OF
COUNTIES

PERCENT

1,162
1,977
3,139

37.02%
62.98%

As seen in Figure 2 below, rural and urban counties have seen a large
upward trend in the pretrial incarceration rate since 1990. Rural pretrial
incarceration rates nationwide were 85.6 per 100,000 residents in 1990,
and this rate quadrupled over the course of twenty-seven years.
Interestingly, before 2005 we see urban pretrial incarceration track higher
than rural pretrial incarceration. This turning point for urban counties
mostly stabilized the rate of pretrial incarceration in the intervening
twelve years while rural rates continued a steady increase.
Given the steady increases for both categories, it may also be helpful
to see if this trend reflects jail population trends generally. While pretrial
incarceration is a subset of the jail population and the rates should be
similar, there may be other factors at play here.

28
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Figure 2

Nationwide Counties
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Figure 2: Here the differences in rural and urban counties' rates of pretrial incarceration are
comapred. These two lines represent the pretrial incarceration population (per 100,000
residents aged 15-64) among all rural and all urban counties nationwide from 1990-2017.

Figure 3 displays the Total Jail Population rate (per 100,000 residents
15-64) for counties nationwide. As with Figure 2, the rate is the average,
continuous rate for each county for years 1990 to 2017. With both rural
and urban counties, we see growth in the Total Jail Population whereas
they differ is in the rate of increase. Urban counties steadily increased
until 2006 when they leveled off for the most part. In contrast to the
pretrial incarceration rate, rural counties' jail population overtook those
of urban counties in 1998, eight years before we would see the same
reflected in the retrial incarceration rate.
Many things could explain the increasing rates: higher levels of crime,
better enforcement, or harsher sentencing. The question of why the rates
are increasing matters, but our focus is on the difference between these
two types of counties. One thing is clear: in the last three decades rural
counties in the United State have increasingly detained individuals
charged, but not convicted, at a much faster pace than urban counties.
Now we shift our focus from the larger nationwide trends to see how
Florida counties fit (or do not fit) with those trends.
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Figure 3

Nationwide Counties
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Figure 3: This figure highlights the differences in rural and urban counties' rates of total jail
population. These two lines represent the average total jail population (per 100,000 residents
aged 15-64) among all rural and all urban counties nationwide from 1990-2017.

V. FLORIDA'S PRETRIAL DETENTION SYSTEM

Florida is the nation's third largest state, with a population of over 21
million.' 7 ' Corresponding to population, Florida operates the third largest
correctional system in the country and the criminal justice system costs
taxpayers $2.4 billion annually.' 72 Florida incarcerates defendants at a
nearly 20% higher rate than the United States as a whole and almost six
times higher than the United Kingdom.' 7 3 This incarceration trend spills
over into the pretrial detention rate for Florida with a clear division
between rural and urban counties.
171. QuickFacts Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/FL
[https://perma.cc/T2GG-NYYT] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).

172. Skyler Swisher, Is Florida's $2.4 Billion Criminal Justice System Due for an
Overhaul?, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 21, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/

news/florida/fl-ne-criminal-justice-reform-roundup-20190321-story.html

[https://perma.cc/C6

Y7-NFJN].

173.

PETER
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WAGNER

&

WENDY
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2018.html [https://perma.cc/Q6T7-5AGS].

SAWYER,
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INITIATIVE,
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2018 (2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/
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This section contains a discussion of the pertinent legal structure,
intra-Florida comparisons, and a focus on the rural-urban divide in
pretrial detention rates. The data presents a disparate picture of outcomes
depending on where an individual is arrested. Seeing these differences
provides an opportunity to assess what solutions could reduce high rates
of pretrial incarceration.
A. Legal Structure
The Florida Constitution provides even greater protection for the
accused at the bail stage than the Federal Constitution.1 74 It requires
pretrial release in non-capital cases with three caveats that can lead to
pretrial detention.1 75 This provision reflects the changes suggested by the
1977-1978 Constitution Revision Commission which found that
defendants tended to be adversely affected by high monetary bail,
76
especially when they could reasonably be expected to appear for trial.1
In addition to defeating the presumption of innocence, this created
overcrowding problems at jails and prisons who had to detain the

accused.1 7 7
The Florida Legislature went further in clarifying the right to bail and
pretrial release in Fla. Stat. § 907.041(1)178 which sets forth further
considerations and creates a presumption in favor of release on nonmonetary conditions. It also sets out nonmonetary condition provisions

174. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life
imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every
person charged with a crime or violation of a municipal ordinance shall be
entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release
can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons,
assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial
process, the accused may be detained.

Id.
175. Id.
176. H.J. Res. 43-H, 1982 Sess. (Fla. 1982).
177. Id.
178. FLA. STAT. § 907.041(1) (2006).
It is the policy of this state that persons committing serious criminal offenses,
posing a threat to the safety of the community or the integrity of the judicial
process, or failing to appear at trial be detained upon arrest. However, persons
found to meet specified criteria shall be released under certain conditions until

proceedings are concluded and adjudication has been determined.

. .

. It is the

intent of the Legislature that the primary consideration be the protection of the

community from risk of physical harm to persons ....
Id.
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to ensure appearance at trial or other proceedings. 179 The Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure reinforce this presumption. 180 Rule 3.131(b)
provides procedures for the Initial Appearance hearing and what types of
non-monetary conditions are acceptable. 181

179. Id.

§ 907.041(3)(a).

It is the intent of the Legislature to create a presumption in favor of release on
nonmonetary conditions for any person who is granted pretrial release .... Such
person shall be released on monetary conditions if it is determined that such
monetary conditions are necessary to assure the presence of the person at trial or
at other proceedings, to protect the community from risk of physical harm to
persons, to assure the presence of the accused at trial, or to assure the integrity
of the judicial process.

Id.
180.

FLA.

R. CRIM. PROC. 3.131(a).

Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life
imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every
person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall
be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions.... If no conditions of
release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to
persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the
judicial process, the accused may be detained.

/d.
181. FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.131(b)(1)(A)-(F).
Unless the state has filed a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to rule 3.132
the court shall conduct a hearing to determine pretrial release. For the purpose of

this rule, bail is defined as any of the forms of release stated below. Except as
otherwise provided by this rule, there is a presumption in favor of release on
nonmonetary conditions for any person who is granted pretrial. release. The
judicial officer shall impose the first of the following conditions of release that
will reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons,
assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial
process; or, if no single condition gives that assurance, shall impose any
combination of the following conditions: (A) personal recognizance of the
defendant; (B) execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount
specified by the judge; (C) placement of restrictions on the travel, association, or
place of abode of the defendant during the period of release; (D) placement of
the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to

supervise the defendant; (E) execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent
sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof, provided, however, that any
criminal defendant who is required to meet monetary bail or bail with any
monetary component may satisfy the bail by providing an appearance bond; or
(F) any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance as
required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after
specified hours.

Id.
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Initial Appearances take place in many settings across Florida. Some
counties conduct these hearings remotely, some have courtrooms at their
county jail facility, but universally, these hearings are short,
informational, and relatively perfunctory. While the accused has the right
to counsel at this hearing, those duties typically fall to an Assistant Public
Defender, handling numerous cases in a crowded courtroom, with little
to no knowledge about the individual they are representing.
B. Intra-FloridaComparisons
Florida is subdivided into sixty-seven counties. These sixty-seven
counties vary widely in population, as well as size. The average
population of a Florida county is 305,733 residents.1 8 2 Lafayette County,
the smallest county, has only 8,479 residents and the largest, MiamiDade, has 2,743,095.183 Twenty-six Florida counties have less than
50,000 residents, and five have a population of more than one million.1 84
Dividing these counties using the 2013 NCHS classification scheme
results in Florida having twenty-three counties considered rural and fortyfour considered urban. Table 2 contains a listing of all Florida counties,
their 2017 populations, existence of a pretrial release program and
classification of rural or urban.
Table 2: List of Florida Counties with Population, whether they have
pretrialrelease or not and if they are classified as ruralor urban.
Rural or Urban
Pretrial
Population
County
(2017)
Urban
Yes
260,003
Alachua
Baker
Bay
Bradford
Brevard
Broward
Calhoun
Charlotte
Citrus

27,191
178,820
27,642
575,211
1,873,970
15,001
172,720
143,801

Clay

208,549

Collier
Columbia

357,470
68,943

182. FLORIDA'S UNIFORM
183. Id.
184. Id

No
Yes
No

Urban
Urban
Rural

Yes

Urban

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Urban
Rural

No
Yes
No

Urban
Urban
Rural

CRIME REPORTS, supra note

Urban
Urban

167 (2017 population and arrest data).
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DeSoto
Dixie

35,621
16,726

No
No

Rural
Rural

Duval

936,811
313,381
105,217
12,161

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Urban
Urban
Urban
Rural

48,263
17,224
13,087
16,297

Urban
Urban
Rural

39,057
181,882

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Escambia
Flagler
Franklin
Gadsden
Gilchrist
Glades
Gulf
Hamilton
Hardee
Hendry
Hernando
Highlands
Hillsborough
Holmes
Indian River

102,138

Yes

1,379,302
20,210
148,962

Jackson
Jefferson
Lafayette
Lake

50,418
14,611
8,479
331,724

Yes
No
No
No
No

Lee

698,468

Leon
Levy
Liberty
Madison
Manatee

287,899
41,015
8,719
19,377
373,305
349,267
153,022
2,743,095
76,889
80,456

Marion
Martin
Miami-Dade
Monroe
Nassau
Okaloosa
Okeechobee

14,663
27,426

Urban
Rural
Rural
Rural
Urban
Urban
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural

No

Urban
Rural

No
Yes

Urban
Urban

Yes
No
No
No
Yes

Urban
Rural
Rural
Rural
Urban

No
No

Urban
Urban

Yes
Yes

Urban
Rural
Urban

195,488

No
Yes

41,140

Yes

Urban
Rural
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Orange
Osceola
Palm Beach

1,313,880
337,614

Yes

Yes

Urban
Urban

1,414,144

Yes
No

Urban
Urban

Yes

Urban
Urban
Rural

Pasco
Pinellas
Polk

505,709
962,003
661,645

Putnam
Santa Rosa

73,176

Sarasota

402,737

Seminole
St. Johns
St. Lucie

454,757

Sumter

120,700
44,690
22,295

Suwannee
Taylor
Union
Volusia
Wakulla
Walton
Washington

170,835

229,715
297,634

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Urban

No

Urban
Rural

Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban

No

Rural

15,947

No
No

523,345
31,909

Yes
No

Rural
Urban
Urban

65,301

No
No

Urban
Rural

24,985

1. Pretrial Detention and Population
Table 3 displays information about the number of urban and rural
counites in Florida along with the intersection of pretrial release
programs. Florida's urban/rural split is not reflective of the country as a
whole, with most counites being considered urban. Among those urban
counites, most have a pretrial release program in place. Within the rural
counties, however, only three have a program designed for this purpose.
Overall, the majority of counties in Florida do not have a pretrial release
program.
Table 3: Tabulation of Rural/Urban and Pretrial Release among
Florida s Counties.
TOTAL
PTR
NO PTR
RURAL/URBAN
(44)
66%
27
17
URBAN

RURAL
TOTAL

20
55% (37)

3
45% (30)

34% (23)
67
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2. Pretrial Incarceration Rates Within Florida
Before dividing the counties based on characteristics, it would be
helpful to examine the general rate of pretrial incarceration statewide.
Figure 4 displays the distribution of pretrial incarceration rates for
Florida's 67 counties from 1990 to 2017. Within Figure 4 we see some
interesting trends. The first, somewhat alarming, trend is in the frequent
appearance of statistical outliers of extreme levels of pretrial
incarceration. In 1990, the highest level of pretrial incarceration within
the state was less than 1,000 inmates per 100,000 residents. For the last
five years we see rates around and above 3,000 inmates per 100,000
people. For example, Glades County detained 2970.66 individuals
pretrial, per 100,000 residents, ages 15-64, in 2017, a population of
13,087185 This would equate to 3% of the population in a single county!
Figure 4

Florida Counties

cyJ
Pretrial Incarcati~

(per I OODOO peoplIe)
1994 1995
200

200

290015

0

Figure 4: This boxplot of Florida counties from 1990-2017 represents the pretrial incarceration
rate per 100,000 residents 15-64) for each of Florida's 67 counties.

More broadly, Figure 4 shows a general trend of increasing pretrial
incarceration statewide. In 1990 the mean rate of pretrial incarceration
among Florida counties was 258.53 inmates per 100,000 residents aged
185. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF IAW & PUBLIC POLICY

36

[Vol. 32

15-64. The rate reached a low of 235.141 in 1993 with the rate increasing
to 413.01 in 2010 and reaching a maximum mean of 462.84 in 2017. For
purposes of comparison, we also have the Total Jail Population rate in
Figure 5 for the same period of time. The trend is very similar to that of
the pretrial incarceration rate.
Figure 5

Florida Counties
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Figure 6 contains a line graph comparing the average pretrial
incarceration rates (per 100,000 residents aged 15-64) between rural and
urban counties. Here we see urban and rural counties incarcerated similar
rates of individuals pretrial for all of the 1990s and into the first two years
of the 2000s. However, in 2002, rural counties overtook urban counties,
detaining consistently more individuals than urban counties through
2017. Interestingly, urban counties saw a decline in pretrial detention
rates between 2005 and 2010 with a small rebound in 2016 and 2017. At
the end of the data, rural counties detained 558.81 individuals per 100,000
residents while urban counites held 412.67 individuals.
Comparing the Florida trends to nationwide trends there is a clear
difference between rural and urban counties. Florida's upward trend in
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pretrial incarceration is consistent with the upward trend nationwide, with
the exception of urban counties who have seen a drop-off and later
increase. This difference shows that a different type of pretrial justice
occurs if an individual is arrested in a rural county, with a higher
likelihood an individual will be detained before trial. Given the enormous
consequences of this decision, the distinction is worth further exploration.
Hopefully, the advent of Florida's new criminal justice database will
facilitate more detailed studies.
Figure 6
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Figure 6: This figure compares the pretrial incarceration rates (per 100,000 residents 15-64)
between Florida' 23 rural and 44 urban counties.

VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

The data reveals a large difference in pretrial detention among rural
and urban counties in Florida. How can we "bridge the gap" statewide
and create a more uniform system of pretrial justice? Many proposals
have been floated in recent years with the goal of bail reform, including
proposals to eliminate the bail bond system altogether. Eliminating
monetary bail could be the so-called "silver bullet."
The solution may already exist in the form of pretrial release programs
administered by counties. In this section we will take a close look at the
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thirty Florida counties which have pretrial release programs. No two
programs are completely alike but there are some similarities among
many of them. These programs are not the solution to all cases, as violent
186
criminals are not eligible for participation in pretrial release programs.
A. PretrialRelease Programs
One way Florida has attempted to implement the promise of
nonmonetary release is through county-level pretrial release programs.
As noted previously, Florida defines the program as "an entity, public or
private, that conducts investigations of pretrial detainees, makes pretrial
release recommendations to a court, and electronically monitors and
supervises pretrial defendants."18' These programs are funded and
administered by counties and local governments.1 88 The OPPAGA
reports for 2014 to 2017 provide a snapshot on how these programs work.
1. Comparing Counties
Figure 7 presents a twenty-seven year comparison between counties
with a pretrial program and counties without programs.1 89 In 1990, the
thirty counties in Florida with pretrial release had a slightly higher rate of
pretrial incarceration than those counties without a program. While a
pretrial release/no program distinction existed from 1990-2000--with
pretrial release counties detaining more defendants pretrial-once the
switch occurred, pretrial release counties maintained a significantly lower
rate of incarceration. In 2010, the counties were separated by sixty-six
inmates per 100,000, this divide more than doubled in size by 2017 to
168 inmates per 100,000. Unsurprisingly, counties with pretrial release
programs detain fewer people, likely due to their inherent goal of release.
However, it is important to establish a baseline of understanding before
further comparing counties.
186. FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.13 1(b)(4).
No person charged with a dangerous crime, as defined in section 907.041(4)(a),
Florida Statutes, shall be released on nonmonetary conditions under the
supervision of a pretrial release service, unless the service certifies to the court

that it has investigated or otherwise verified the conditions set forth in section
907.041(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 907.043(2)(b) (2020).
188. OPPAGA, supra note 166, at 2.
189. See IncarcerationTrends, supra note 160 (click on "Pretrial Jail Incarceration" from
the webpage, then select a county from the dropdown.window on the webpage to find specific
county statistics). It is worth noting while the comparison runs from 1990 to 2017, the

classification of a county having or not having a pretrial release program is based on having a
program during 2014 to 2017. See supra Table 2 (listing Florida counties with and without pretrial
release programs).
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Figure 7
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Figure 7: These two lines represent the Florida counties with and without pretrial release
programs, comparing the rate of pretrial incarceration per 100,000 residents aged 15-64.

Do pretrial release programs have a similar impact on both rural and.
urban counties? Figure 8 contains a comparison of urban and rural
counties with and without pretrial release (PTR). This data has a varying
distribution among all counties with wide ranging annual swings. One
general trend apparent throughout these analyses is the increase in levels
of pretrial incarceration across the board over the last thirty years.
Urban Florida counties, as we saw above in Figure 5, generally detain
fewer individuals before trial than their rural counterparts. Among those
urban counties, we see similar peaks and valleys between counties with
and without pretrial release programs. After 2000, counties with pretrial
release programs detained individuals pretrial at a lower rate than their
counterparts without PTR. After 2010, those urban counties show the
lowest rates of pretrial incarceration, ending 2017 with a rate of 342.21.
Rural counties have a distinct, if incomplete, story. Before examining
Figure 8, it is worth noting that only three of Florida's twenty-three rural
counties have pretrial release programs. This small number makes it
challenging to identify real trends and distinguish these rural counties
from their urban counterparts.. As we will see below, these three rural
counties serve a very small number of individuals each year, which could
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account for the seemingly skewed results when compared with urban
counties. What we do see among rural counties is a steady increase over
time, increasing to an average of 620.53 individuals detained pretrial (per
100,000 residents) in counties with pretrial release and those counties
without pretrial release at 549.55.
While these averaged rates provide a small picture of the patterns, it
is clear that, among urban counties, those with pretrial release programs
detain fewer individuals before trial. Many factors could play a role in
these differences: different utilization rates of these programs, different
conditions, and the preferences of judges at initial appearance hearings.
Remember that release decisions are at the discretion of the judge, with
the statute providing a wide discretion for decision-making.
Figure 8
Rural Florida Counties

Urban Florida Counties
700'

600-

/

/

/

600.

4001

Ti

g

I

300-

A
1000

1995

20C00

PTR (7)

'005.

20I10

2Q15

1994

1995

No PS 0~7

2000

PTR(
Pia--

2005

2010

2015

No PT R (2U

Figure 8: These two graphs represent, again, the pretrial incarceration rates per 100,000 residents
aged 15-64. In these graphs, counties are grouped together both by rural/urban and those having

pretrial release programs and those without.

2. Utilization and Costs
How much are these programs utilized and what do they cost per
person served? In Table 4 we see a sample comparing the three rural

2021]
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counties with PTR (Okeechobee, Putnam, and Munroe) with three
selected urban counties (Broward, Alachua, and Santa Rosa).1 9 0 Among
the rural counties with PTR, it appears only Monroe County makes large
use of its pretrial release program, serving over 800 individuals in each
of the years observed. While Putnam County has a pretrial release
program, it was rarely used between 2014 and 2017. Okeechobee County
presents a slightly different case, as its program is administered by
neighboring St. Lucie County.1 91
Among the urban counties, we see a per capita usage of pretrial release
in 2017 (individuals served divided by the population) at 0.0032 for
Broward, 0.0056 for Alachua, and 0.005 for Santa Rosa. Monroe, clearly
an outlier at 0.013, has a usage double that of the urban counties. This
could be explained in part due to the high level of tourism in the Florida
Keys, with a daily population much larger than the permanent resident
population.
Table 4: This tableprovides the population and number of defendantsserved from 2014-2017 .fr six Florida counties with pretrial release
programs. The first three counties are classified as rural and the last
three are urban.
Defendants Served
Population
County
2017
2014
2015
2016
2017
Okeechobee 41,140
14
77
137
Putnam
73,173
11
1
2
3
Monroe
76,889
977
878
838
979
Santa Rosa
170,835
530
827
630
848
Alachua
260,003
1,062
1,396
1,466
1,463
Broward
1,873,970
59,34
6,171
6,180
5,981
Costs are an important metric to consider as well. Table 5 shows the
average cost per person served among all Florida counties. There is wide
variation in the cost per person with some counties recording no costs and
others having very minimal costs. It seems safe to say, however, that
pretrial release programs tend to operate for less than $1,000 per
190. See Incarceration Trends, supra note 160 (click on "Pretrial Jail Incarceration" from
the webpage, then select a county from the dropdown window on the webpage to find specific
county statistics). Broward, Alachua and Santa Rosa counites were chosen given their different
size and geographic locations within Florida. Santa Rosa is located in the panhandle, Alachua in
the north part of central Florida and Broward in south Florida.

191. SeeOPPAGA, supra note 166, at 3 (explaining that St. Lucie County has supervised
Defendants for Okeechobee County since August 2015). St. Lucie and Okeechobee are part of the
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, along with Martin and Indian River County. NINETEENTH JUD. CIR.
OF FLA., http://www.circuit19.org/ [https://perma.cc/MM4P-RRFA] (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
Martin and Indian River counties do not have pretrial release programs. See supra Table 2 (listing
Florida counties with and without pretrial release programs).
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individual served, with the vast majority of programs costing far less than
that.
Table 5: Here we see the average cost per defendant served among
all the pretrial release programs in Florida, as well as the standard
deviation, minumum and maximum values for 2014-2017.
Max
Min
Std.
Year Average Cost
Deviation
(Per Person
Served)

2014
2015
2016

$477.54
$640.32
$568.28

$339.94
$820.78
$501.73

$20
0
$49

$1,220
$4,318
$1,981

2017

$543.76

$425.86

$46

$1,661

3. Effectiveness
Another helpful metric for determining if these pretrial programs are
effective is by examining comparative rates of failures to appear. Failures
1 92
to appear can be costly for the court system as well as the defendant.
Prior studies have found these rates can approach 25-30% in some
jurisdictions.1 93
Table 6 shows the relative rates of failures to appear in urban and rural
counties with pretrial release programs from 2014 to 2017. As we have
seen in prior examinations, the number of observations for rural programs
is limited but the relative rate of FTA is very low-less than 1% of
defendants in each year fail to appear on their court dates.1 94 While urban
rates are higher, they are substantially lower than those observed
elsewhere.
Table 6: This table contains the relative rates of FTAs frr counties
with pretrialrelease broken down by the rural/urbanclassification.
Total
2017
2016
2015
2014

Urban

2.83

2.64

2.85

3.29

98

Rural

0.97

0.68

0.35

0.65

11

Re-arrest rates can also be illustrative of the effectiveness of these
programs. Among released defendants nationwide, around 16% of

-

192. Bornstein et al., supra, note 123, at 70. This study examined FTA rates and the effect

of reminders. Id. High FTA rates can be mitigated through substantive reminders of the impact of
a failure to appear. Id.

193. Id.
194. Id
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defendants are rearrested.1 95 As seen in Table 7, rural and urban counties
with pretrial release programs experience low levels of rearrest rates.
Again, the small number of participating rural counties makes a larger
pattern difficult to discern.
Table 7: This table contains the relative rates of rearrestfor counties
with pretrialrelease broken down by the rural/urbanclassification.
2014
2015
2016
2017
Total

Urban

4.37

3.808

4.148

4.111

107

Rural

5

0.667

0.333

1.333

11

4. Conditions
As noted above, rural and urban counties administer probation and
juvenile justice in different ways. In the context of pretrial release
programs there are several types of conditions: GPS monitoring, alcohol
testing, drug testing, and paying cost of supervision. Nineteen of the thirty
participating counties reported the types of administration they deploy:
Table 8 specifies the types of supervision for urban and rural counties.
Table 8: This table includes counts ofprogram monitoring methods
in pretrial release programs, broken down by rural and urban
classification.

GPS
_..Testing Testing

Supervision

b

Alcohol

Drug

Cost of

-

Urban
Rural

12
3

7
0

9
1

6
1

Total

15

7

8

7

GPS monitoring is used almost universally among jurisdictions, with
fifteen of the nineteen reporting counties using this mode of release. This
makes sense, because GPS monitoring allows the county to supervise a
released person without having to bear the cost of housing, feeding and
supervising the individual. Alcohol and drug testing are less frequently
deployed, likely in part because these methods in certain contexts can be
considered forms of rehabilitation or punishment before conviction. Cost
of supervision fees are also lesser used forms of supervision.
5. Fees
Funding is also an important element to these programs, as counties
must fund pretrial release programs without assistance from the state of
Florida. Some counties elect to outsource supervision (and thus fees) to
195.

& JACOB
12 (1994).

BRIAN A. REAVES

FELONY DEFENDANTS,

PEREZ, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., PRETRIAL RELEASE OF
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private entities to supervise GPS monitoring or alcohol monitoring. Some
counties mandate fee payments to pay for the program or to the county's
general fund, with other counties using a mix of fee assessments. Table 9
breaks down the fee assessment by urban and rural counties. Again, with
a low number of rural counties, it can be difficult to discern any pattern,
but counties of all sizes use these fees in different ways.
Table 9: This table displays the differentfee allocationsfor counties
with pretrialrelease programsfor 2017.
Total
Mix
County
Program
Vendor
Revenue

Urban

4

5

4

4

17

Rural
Total

0
4

0
5

2
6

1
5

3
20

B. Rural Challenges
Fixing pretrial justice in rural counties presents a series of challenges,
some of which are less of a problem for urban counties. Rural counties
typically have less resources, smaller populations, and often larger
geographical boundaries. 196 Population dispersion means that individuals
must travel larger distances for pretrial appointments and court,
presenting challenges for defendants with transportation issues.
Perhaps the larger problem is that of limited personnel and experts.
Urban jurisdictions process a larger number of cases and thus the cost of
pretrial release programs can be scaled effectively to lower the overall
cost to taxpayers. Rural counties must find systems to deliver pretrial
justice in cost-effective ways.
Lacking bureaucratic resources can be a drawback to a certain type of
administration of pretrial release, but these smaller jurisdictions retain the
advantage of being small. Their small size means program creation is less
costly to develop and implement and can be more flexible. Pretrial release
can serve as a means of problem solving rather than a vague
administration of bureaucracy.
The harsh reality for cash-strapped rural counties is that pretrial
programs cost money to develop and implement. Small counties must
make every program count because they cannot rely on scale to lower
costs. Adjacent rural counties duplicating services can stifle the ability to
innovate and create cost-effective programs. One approach to solving
cost-related obstacles would be to create circuit-wide, ratherthan county196.

STEPHANIEJ. VETTER
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JOHN CLARK, NAT'L ASS'N OF CNTYS., THE DELIVERY OF

PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN RURAL AREAS:

A

GUIDE FOR RURAL

COUNTY OFFICIALS

(2013),

2
https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/The%20Delivery%200f%/o2OPretrial% OJusti

ce%20in%20Rural%20Areas%20-%20A%20Guide%20for%20Rural%20County%20Officials
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level, pretrial release programs. For instance, St. Lucie County, a midsized Florida county, administers the pretrial release program of its'
neighbor and circuit-mate Okeechobee county. Florida's circuit courts
span as many as seven counties and five circuits are comprised of one
county. 197
Jail administration is almost exclusively county-based, with either a
sheriffs office or county corrections agency overseeing those
incarcerated. 19 8 Some counties contain more than one county level
correctional facility, with Miami-Dade having five. 199 Not all of Florida's
counties are part of judicial circuits with larger counties, but this type of
cost-sharing can assist in implementing these programs. Judicial circuits
share judges, State Attorneys, and Public Defenders, why not pretrial
release administrators?
CONCLUSION

Recently, The Florida Times-Union (FTU) circulated an editorial
titled "Save money, lives with less imprisonment," which outlines many
of the reasons why Florida is an epicenter of over-incarceration. 2 00 One
of the primary rationales for reform is the high rate of pretrial detention,
mostly due to the inability to pay bail money. 20 1 Among the proposals
FTU suggests is the expanded use of pretrial services like pretrial release
programs. 2 02

Defendants face an uphill battle throughout the criminal justice
process. The government and judges retain substantial power and
resources at each stage of any given case, controlling much of the timing
and terms. As the data indicates, in the rural context the accused face a
system that marginalizes their options even more. 2 03 High pretrial
detention rates run roughshod over the presumption of innocence, a
bedrock principle of the American criminal justice system. Disparate

197. Trial Courts - Circuit, FLA. CTS., https://www.flcourts.org/Florida-Courts/Trial-CourtsCircuit [https://perma.cc/PSF9-64PC] (last visited Aug. 12, 2020).
198. FLA. STAT. § 951.061 (2020).
199. BUREAU OF RSCH. & DATA ANALYSIS, FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., FLORIDA COUNTY
DETENTION FACILITIES AVERAGE INMATE POPULATION 4 tbl. 2 (2020), http://www.dc.state.
fl.us/pub/jails/2020/jails-2020-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A3Z-AQGM]. Several geographically
larger or large population counties have jails spread throughout the area of their county. For
example, the Monroe County Detention Center is located approximately 85 miles from the
Plantation Key Detention Center, both operated by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office.
200. The Florida Times-Union, Editorial, Save Money, Lives with Less Imprisonment, PALM
BEACH POST (Aug. 16, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/opinion/20200816/
editorial-save-money-lives-with-less-imprisonment [https://perma.cc/T8MS-NR4R].

201. Id.
202. Id
203. VETTER & CLARK, supra note 196.
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treatment in rural versus urban contexts runs afoul of equal justice
principles as well.
With an average cost per time served of around $500, pretrial release
programs could serve as a solution to widespread pretrial detention
among the state's rural counties. As noted previously, the median felony
bond nationwide is $10,000 (translating to a cost of $1,000 in the form of
a premium). 204 Even for low-level detainees the cost-savings could be
great, considering it costs roughly $135 per day to house an inmate in
some of Florida's county jails. 05 A fee assessed during a pretrial release
program, unlike a bail bond, holds an individual accountable to pay for
some measure of costs without it being a threshold question of release.
In addition to costing the government less money, pretrial release can
have a significant upside to individuals as well. While this Article noted
that pretrial detention can have a major economic cost to defendants,
there is a notable net benefit of pretrial release. Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang
found:
We estimate that the net benefit of pretrial release at the
margin is between $55,143 and $99,124 per defendant. The
large net benefit of pretrial release is driven by both the
significant collateral consequences of having a criminal
conviction on labor market outcomes and the relatively low
costs of apprehending defendants who fail to appear in court.
The results from this exercise suggest that unless there are
large general deterrence effects of detaining individuals
before trial, releasing more defendants will likely increase
social welfare. 2 06
This solution does not require a retooling of the current system, no
major reform needs to pass through the legislature; the systems are in
place already, and counties need to decide if the cost to their communities
is worth it. In the context of a pandemic, health and safety resources used
to supervise a jail population might be better deployed to assist counties
in emergency management.
The data currently available paints an incomplete picture of the
process in Florida. While county jail populations allow us to analyze the
rates of pretrial detention, there is a need for defendant and case specific
data to discern larger patterns. Do low-level charges receive disparate
treatment in rural counties? How many defendants are detained for being
unable to pay a bond of even $100?

204. Reeves, supra note 85.

205. Larry Barszewski, Millions Spent in South Floridato JailSmall-Time Offenders, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL (Nov. 17, 2017, 5:35 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/crime/fl-reg-

broward-adult-civil-citations-2017111 6-story.html [https://perma.cc/C4NF-4X2V].
206. Dobbie et al., supra note 102.
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Hopefully, Florida SB 1392 (2018) will help provide these answers.
With the addition of over 140 data points, researchers will be better able
to observe patterns. Future researchers would be hard pressed to answer
some of these questions:
What charges most often result in pretrial incarceration? Do
we see these charges more often in rural or urban contexts?
What is the source of racial disparity in pretrial detention?
How does it relate to the rural-urban divide?
What effect does each individual judge have on pretrial
incarceration? Is this related to political affiliation or other
individual characteristics?

